

Robust Bayesian Estimation of System Reliability with Scarce and Surprising Data

Gero Walter¹, Andrew Graham², Frank Coolen²


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


ESREL 2015



(1 out of ℓ)

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 $R_{\text{sys}}(t) = P(T_{\text{sys}} > t)$ based on



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
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ℓ observations, each being either

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


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How to combine these two information sources?

expert info + data → complete picture

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prior distribution + likelihood → posterior distribution

$p(\lambda)$ × $p_c(\mathbf{t} | \lambda)$ ∝ $p(\lambda | \mathbf{t})$ ▶ Bayes' Rule

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|-----------|--|
| expert info | + | data | → | complete picture |
| prior distribution | + | likelihood | → | posterior distribution |
| $p(\lambda)$ | × | $p_c(\mathbf{t} \lambda)$ | \propto | $p(\lambda \mathbf{t})$ ▶ Bayes' Rule |
| ↓ | | ↓ | | ↓ |
| inverse Gamma prior | | Weibull with fixed shape k | | inverse Gamma posterior ▶ conjugacy |
| $\lambda \sim \text{IG}(\alpha^{(0)}, \beta^{(0)})$ | | $\mathbf{t} \lambda \sim \text{Wei}_k(\lambda)$ | | $\lambda \mathbf{t} \sim \text{IG}(\alpha^{(\ell)}, \beta^{(\ell)})$ |

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- ▶ makes learning about component reliability tractable, just update parameters: $\alpha^{(0)} \rightarrow \alpha^{(\ell)}, \beta^{(0)} \rightarrow \beta^{(\ell)}$
- ▶ conjugacy holds also for censored observations
- ▶ closed form for system reliability function $R_{\text{sys}}(t | \mathbf{t})$

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► reparametrization helps to understand effect of prior-data conflict:

$$n^{(0)} = \alpha^{(0)} - 1, \quad y^{(0)} = \beta^{(0)} / (\alpha^{(0)} - 1), \quad \text{where}$$


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
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$E[\lambda | \mathbf{t}]$ is a weighted average of $E[\lambda]$ and $\hat{\lambda}$!


Prior-data conflict example

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
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
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
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
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- ▶ Can also be seen as systematic sensitivity analysis or robust Bayesian approach.

Uncertainty about probability statements

smaller sets = more precise probability statements

Lottery A

Number of winning tickets:
exactly known as 5 out of 100

$$\rightarrow P(\text{win}) = 5/100$$

Lottery B

Number of winning tickets:
not exactly known, supposedly
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
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
Walter and Augustin (2009), Walter (2013):


$$\Pi^{(0)} = [\underline{n}^{(0)}, \bar{n}^{(0)}] \times [\underline{y}^{(0)}, \bar{y}^{(0)}]$$


gives tractability & meaningful reaction to prior-data conflict:


- ▶ larger set of posteriors
- ▶ more imprecise / cautious probability statements

















- ▶ Closed form for the system reliability:

$$R_{\text{sys}}(t \mid \mathbf{t}_m^\ell, n^{(0)}, \mathbf{y}^{(0)}) \\ = 1 - \sum_{i=0}^{\ell-m} (-1)^i \binom{\ell-m}{i} \left(\frac{n^{(0)} y^{(0)} + (\ell-m) t_{\text{now}}^k + \sum_{j=1}^m t_j^k}{n^{(0)} y^{(0)} + (\ell-m-i) t_{\text{now}}^k + \sum_{j=1}^m t_j^k + i t^k} \right)^{n^{(0)}+m+1}$$


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
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
- ▶ Lower / upper bound through optimization for each t :


$$\underline{R}_{\text{sys}}(t \mid \mathbf{t}_m^\ell, \Pi^{(0)}) = \min_{n^{(0)} \in [\underline{n}^{(0)}, \bar{n}^{(0)}]} R_{\text{sys}}(t \mid \mathbf{t}_m^\ell, n^{(0)}, \underline{\mathbf{y}}^{(0)})$$

$$\bar{R}_{\text{sys}}(t \mid \mathbf{t}_m^\ell, \Pi^{(0)}) = \max_{n^{(0)} \in [\underline{n}^{(0)}, \bar{n}^{(0)}]} R_{\text{sys}}(t \mid \mathbf{t}_m^\ell, n^{(0)}, \bar{\mathbf{y}}^{(0)})$$










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- ▶ Use model for maintenance planning


- Coolen, Frank P. A. and Tahani Coolen-Maturi (2012). “Generalizing the Signature to Systems with Multiple Types of Components”. In: *Complex Systems and Dependability*. Ed. by W. Zamojski et al. Vol. 170. Advances in Intelligent and Soft Computing. Springer, pp. 115–130. DOI: [10.1007/978-3-642-30662-4_8](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30662-4_8).
- Walley, Peter (1991). *Statistical Reasoning with Imprecise Probabilities*. London: Chapman and Hall.
- Walter, Gero (2013). “Generalized Bayesian Inference under Prior-Data Conflict”. PhD thesis. Department of Statistics, LMU Munich. URL: <http://edoc.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17059/>.
- Walter, Gero and Thomas Augustin (2009). “Imprecision and Prior-Data Conflict in Generalized Bayesian Inference”. In: *Journal of Statistical Theory and Practice* 3, pp. 255–271. DOI: [10.1080/15598608.2009.10411924](https://doi.org/10.1080/15598608.2009.10411924).

System Reliability Estimation under Prior-Data Conflict

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System reliability

 We want to find the system reliability $P(T_{\text{sys}} > t)$ for a one-of-a-kind system:

 The system consists of n_k exchangeable components of types $\{1, \dots, k\}$

 Need to minimize over λ_k 's only, as min must be reached for $\lambda_k^{(0)}$'s (lower expected lifetimes \rightarrow lower component survival probabilities \rightarrow lower system survival probability)

Component Lifetimes

 The lifetimes for each λ_k are assumed as Weibull with fixed shape β :

$$F_k(t | \lambda_k) = 1 - e^{-\lambda_k t^\beta}$$

$$E(T_k | \lambda_k) = \sqrt[\beta]{\lambda_k^{-1} \Gamma(1 + 1/\beta)}$$

 We have information on λ_k from the component manufacturer, but do not fully trust it and model knowledge on λ_k cautiously with a set of priors $\lambda_k^{(0)}$

Set of Priors

 Each $\lambda_k^{(0)}$ is taken as a set of conjugate inverse Gamma priors. In terms of canonical parameters $\alpha^{(0)}$, $\nu^{(0)}$, $\lambda_k^{(0)} = \{ \text{IG}(\alpha^{(0)} + 1, \nu^{(0)} \lambda_k^{(0)}) | \lambda_k^{(0)} \in \mathbb{R}^+, \nu^{(0)} \in \mathbb{N} \}$, where $\lambda_k^{(0)} = E[\lambda_k | \alpha^{(0)}, \nu^{(0)}]$ and $\lambda_k^{(0)}$ are pseudocounts. The prior parameter set $\{ \alpha^{(0)} = \sum_{k=1}^k \alpha_k^{(0)}, \nu^{(0)} = \sum_{k=1}^k \nu_k^{(0)} \}$ allows for more impression in case of prior-data conflict [2].

Data

 We observe the system from startup until t_{obs} . For each t , the data \mathcal{D}_t consists of n_k failure times and $n_k - n_k$ censored observations. $\alpha_k^{(0)}$ and $\nu_k^{(0)}$ are updated to $\alpha_k^{(t)}$ and $\nu_k^{(t)}$ via Bayes' Rule.

$$P(T_{\text{sys}} > t | \{ \alpha_k^{(0)}, \nu_k^{(0)}, t_{\text{obs}} \})^{(*)} = \sum_{k_1=0}^{n_1} \sum_{k_2=0}^{n_2} \dots \sum_{k_k=0}^{n_k} \binom{n_1}{k_1} \dots \binom{n_k}{k_k} \prod_{k=1}^k P(C_k^t = k_k | \alpha_k^{(0)}, \nu_k^{(0)}, t_{\text{obs}})$$

 Survival signature $\theta_k = (\theta_k^1, \dots, \theta_k^k | 1)$
 $\theta_k = P(\text{system functions} | \{ \lambda_k \})$ function $\theta_k^{(t)}$

| | | | |
|-------|-------|-------|------|
| k_1 | k_2 | k_3 | 1 |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0.2 |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0.5 |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0.75 |
| 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 |
| 1 | : | : | : |


 Posterior predictive probability that k_k of the $n_k - n_k$ surviving \square 's function at time t :

$$\binom{n_k - n_k}{k_k} \int P(T_k > t | T > t_{\text{obs}}, \lambda_k)^{n_k - n_k} \int_{\lambda_k} \left[1 - P_k(T > t | T > t_{\text{obs}}, \lambda_k) \right]^{n_k - n_k - k_k} f_{\text{inv}}(\lambda_k | \alpha_k^{(0)}, \nu_k^{(0)}, t_{\text{obs}}, k_k) d\lambda_k$$


$$= \binom{n_k - n_k}{k_k} \sum_{j=0}^{n_k - n_k - k_k} (-1)^j \binom{n_k - n_k - k_k}{j} \left(\frac{\alpha_k^{(0)} \nu_k^{(0)}}{\alpha_k^{(0)} \nu_k^{(0)} + (k_k + j) \beta - (n_k - n_k) \beta} \right)^{\alpha_k^{(0)} \nu_k^{(0)}}$$

 We assume $\beta = 2$, $E(T_1 | \alpha_1^{(0)}) \in [3, 15]$, $\alpha_1^{(0)} \in [2, 16]$, $E(T_2 | \alpha_2^{(0)}) \in [4, 5]$, $\alpha_2^{(0)} \in [3, 16]$, and $E(T_3 | \alpha_3^{(0)}) \in [3, 5]$, $\alpha_3^{(0)} \in [3, 5]$.


Failure times as expected



Surprisingly early failures



Surprisingly late failures



References

- Frank P.A. Coolen and Tahani-Castan-Masou. Generalizing the signature to systems with multiple types of components. In W. Zaretski, J. Mouchonvitz, J. Gupte, T. Welikow, and J. Kapanan, editors, *Complex Systems and Dependability*, volume 176 of *Advances in Intelligent and Soft Computing*, pages 110–130. Springer, 2012.
- G. Walter. Generalized Bayesian Inference under Prior-Data Conflict. PhD thesis, Department of Statistics, LMU Munich, 2013. <https://pubsonline.informaworld.com/doi/10.1080/10487797.2013.817333>.

System Reliability Estimation under Prior-Data Conflict

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System reliability

 We want to find the system reliability $P(T_{\text{sys}} > t)$ for a one-of-a-kind system:

 The system consists of n_k exchangeable components of types $k=1, \dots, K$.

 Need to minimize over λ_k 's only, as min must be reached for λ_k^0 's (lower expected lifetimes \rightarrow lower component survival probabilities \rightarrow lower system survival probability).

Component Lifetimes

 The lifetime for each k is assumed as Weibull with fixed shape β :

$$F_k(t | \lambda_k) = 1 - e^{-\lambda_k t^\beta}$$

$$R_k^0(t) = \sqrt[\beta]{\lambda_k (\beta + 1) / \beta}$$

 We have information on λ_k from the component manufacturer, but do not fully trust it and model knowledge on λ_k cautiously with a set of priors $\lambda_k^{(j)}$.

Set of Priors

 Each $\lambda_k^{(j)}$ is taken as a set of conjugate inverse Gamma priors. In terms of canonical parameters $\alpha^{(j)}$, $\nu^{(j)}$, $\lambda_k^{(j)} = \text{IG}(\alpha^{(j)} + 1, \nu^{(j)} \lambda_k^{(j)})$ and $\lambda_k^{(j)}$ are pseudocounts, where $\alpha^{(j)} = E[\lambda_k | \alpha^{(j)}, \nu^{(j)}]$ and $\nu^{(j)}$ are pseudocounts. The prior parameter set $\{ \alpha^{(j)}, \nu^{(j)} \}_{j=1, \dots, J}$ allows for more imprecision in case of prior-data conflict [2].

Data

 We observe the system from startup until t_{obs} . For each k , the data $t_{k, \text{obs}}$ consists of n_k failure times and $n_k - n_k$ censored observations. $\alpha_k^{(j)}$ and $\nu_k^{(j)}$ are updated to $\alpha_k^{(j)}$ and $\nu_k^{(j)}$ via Bayes' Rule.

$$P(T_{\text{sys}} > t | \{ \alpha_k^{(j)}, \nu_k^{(j)}, t_{k, \text{obs}} \}_{k=1, \dots, K}) = \int \prod_{k=1}^K P_k(T > t | \lambda_k) \prod_{j=1}^J P(\lambda_k | \alpha_k^{(j)}, \nu_k^{(j)}, t_{k, \text{obs}})$$

 Survival signature $\theta_k = (\dots, \lambda_k | T)$

 = P(system functions) | $\{ \lambda_k | T \}$ function (n_k)

| | | | | |
|-------------|-------------|-----|-----|------|
| λ_k | λ_j | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.2 | 1 |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| 0 | 1 | 0.5 | 1 | 0.5 |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0.5 | 1 |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.75 |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |


 Posterior predictive probability that λ_k of the $n_k - n_k$ surviving \square 's function at time t :

$$\binom{n_k - n_k}{n_k} \int P_k(T > t | \tau > t_{\text{obs}}, \lambda_k) \dots$$


$$= \binom{n_k - n_k}{n_k} \sum_{j=1}^J (-1)^{n_k - j} \binom{n_k - 1}{j} \left(\frac{\alpha_k^{(j)} \nu_k^{(j)}}{\alpha_k^{(j)} \nu_k^{(j)} + (n_k - j)t^\beta} \right)^{n_k - 1}$$

 We assume $\beta = 2$, $R_k^0(t) \in [3, 15]$, $\alpha_k^{(j)} \in [2, 16]$, $\nu_k^{(j)} \in [4, 5]$, $\alpha_k^{(j)} \in [3, 16]$, and $R_k^0(t) \in [3, 15]$, $\alpha_k^{(j)} \in [3, 5]$.


Failure times as expected



Surprisingly early failures




Surprisingly late failures



References

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- [2] G. Walter. Generalized Bayesian Inference under Prior-Data Conflict. PhD thesis, Department of Statistics, LMU Munich, 2013. <https://pub.uni-leipzig.de/walter/17333/>.

Surprisingly early failures




Survival signature $\Phi(l_1, \dots, l_K)$ [1]

$= P(\text{system functions} \mid \{l_k \text{ 's function}\}^{1:K})$

| l_1 | l_2 | l_3 | Φ | l_1 | l_2 | l_3 | Φ |
|-------|-------|-------|--------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0.5 |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.75 |
| 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | \vdots | \vdots | \vdots | \vdots |


Surprisingly early failures



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| l_1 | l_2 | l_3 | Φ | l_1 | l_2 | l_3 | Φ |
|-------|-------|-------|--------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0.5 |
| 0 | 1 | 1 | 0.5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.75 |
| 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | \vdots | \vdots | \vdots | \vdots |

Surprisingly early failures



$$\underline{P}(T_{\text{sys}} > t \mid \{n_k^{(0)}, y_k^{(0)}, \mathbf{t}_{e_k; n_k}^k\}^{1:K})$$

$$= \min_{n_1^{(0)}, \dots, n_K^{(0)}} \sum_{l_1=0}^{n_1-e_1} \dots \sum_{l_K=0}^{n_K-e_K} \Phi(l_1, \dots, l_K) \prod_{k=1}^K P(C_t^k = l_k \mid n_k^{(0)}, \underline{y}_k^{(0)}, \mathbf{t}_{e_k; n_k}^k)$$