

Robust Bayesian Estimation of System Reliability with Scarce and Surprising Data

Gero Walter¹, Andrew Graham², Frank Coolen²


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


ESREL 2015



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 $R_{\text{sys}}(t) = P(T_{\text{sys}} > t)$ based on

(1 out of ℓ)



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
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


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How to combine these two information sources?

expert info + data → complete picture

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prior distribution + likelihood → posterior distribution

$$p(\lambda) \times p_c(\mathbf{t} | \lambda) \propto p(\lambda | \mathbf{t}) \quad \blacktriangleright \text{Bayes' Rule}$$

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$p(\lambda)$	×	$p_c(\mathbf{t} \lambda)$	\propto	$p(\lambda \mathbf{t})$ ▶ Bayes' Rule
↓		↓	↓	
inverse Gamma prior		Weibull with fixed shape k		inverse Gamma posterior ▶ conjugacy
$\lambda \sim \text{IG}(\alpha^{(0)}, \beta^{(0)})$		$\mathbf{t} \lambda \sim \text{Wei}_k(\lambda)$		$\lambda \mathbf{t} \sim \text{IG}(\alpha^{(\ell)}, \beta^{(\ell)})$

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- ▶ makes learning about component reliability tractable, just update parameters: $\alpha^{(0)} \rightarrow \alpha^{(\ell)}, \beta^{(0)} \rightarrow \beta^{(\ell)}$
- ▶ conjugacy holds also for censored observations
- ▶ closed form for system reliability function $R_{\text{sys}}(t | \mathbf{t})$

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► reparametrization helps to understand effect of prior-data conflict:

$$n^{(0)} = \alpha^{(0)} - 1, \quad y^{(0)} = \beta^{(0)} / (\alpha^{(0)} - 1), \quad \text{where}$$


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
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$E[\lambda | \mathbf{t}]$ is a weighted average of $E[\lambda]$ and $\hat{\lambda}$!


Prior-data conflict example

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
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
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
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
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Sets of priors model uncertainty in probability statements and allow to better model partial or vague information on λ .
- ▶ Separate uncertainty *within the model* (reliability statements) from uncertainty *about the model* (which parameters).
- ▶ Can also be seen as systematic sensitivity analysis or robust Bayesian approach.

Uncertainty about probability statements

smaller sets = more precise probability statements

Lottery A

Number of winning tickets:
exactly known as 5 out of 100

$$\rightarrow P(\text{win}) = 5/100$$

Lottery B

Number of winning tickets:
not exactly known, supposedly
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Let parameters $(n^{(0)}, y^{(0)})$ vary in a set $\Pi^{(0)} \rightarrow$ set of priors

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
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
Walter and Augustin (2009), Walter (2013):

$$\Pi^{(0)} = [\underline{n}^{(0)}, \bar{n}^{(0)}] \times [\underline{y}^{(0)}, \bar{y}^{(0)}]$$

gives tractability & meaningful reaction to prior-data conflict:


- ▶ larger set of posteriors
- ▶ more imprecise / cautious probability statements








Sets of prior distributions: examples


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- ▶ Closed form for the system reliability:

$$R_{\text{sys}}(t \mid \mathbf{t}_m^\ell, n^{(0)}, \mathbf{y}^{(0)})$$
$$= 1 - \sum_{i=0}^{\ell-m} (-1)^i \binom{\ell-m}{i} \left(\frac{n^{(0)} y^{(0)} + (\ell-m) t_{\text{now}}^k + \sum_{j=1}^m t_j^k}{n^{(0)} y^{(0)} + (\ell-m-i) t_{\text{now}}^k + \sum_{j=1}^m t_j^k + i t^k} \right)^{n^{(0)}+m+1}$$


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
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
- ▶ Lower / upper bound through optimization for each t :


$$\underline{R}_{\text{sys}}(t \mid \mathbf{t}_m^\ell, \Pi^{(0)}) = \min_{n^{(0)} \in [\underline{n}^{(0)}, \bar{n}^{(0)}]} R_{\text{sys}}(t \mid \mathbf{t}_m^\ell, n^{(0)}, \underline{\mathbf{y}}^{(0)})$$

$$\bar{R}_{\text{sys}}(t \mid \mathbf{t}_m^\ell, \Pi^{(0)}) = \max_{n^{(0)} \in [\underline{n}^{(0)}, \bar{n}^{(0)}]} R_{\text{sys}}(t \mid \mathbf{t}_m^\ell, n^{(0)}, \bar{\mathbf{y}}^{(0)})$$










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
- Coolen, Frank P. A. and Tahani Coolen-Maturi (2012). “Generalizing the Signature to Systems with Multiple Types of Components”. In: *Complex Systems and Dependability*. Ed. by W. Zamojski et al. Vol. 170. Advances in Intelligent and Soft Computing. Springer, pp. 115–130. DOI: [10.1007/978-3-642-30662-4_8](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30662-4_8).
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- Walter, Gero (2013). “Generalized Bayesian Inference under Prior-Data Conflict”. PhD thesis. Department of Statistics, LMU Munich. URL: <http://edoc.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17059/>.
- Walter, Gero and Thomas Augustin (2009). “Imprecision and Prior-Data Conflict in Generalized Bayesian Inference”. In: *Journal of Statistical Theory and Practice* 3, pp. 255–271. DOI: [10.1080/15598608.2009.10411924](https://doi.org/10.1080/15598608.2009.10411924).

System Reliability Estimation under Prior-Data Conflict

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System reliability

 We want to find the system reliability $P(T_{\text{rem}} > t)$ for a one-of-a-kind system:

 The system consists of n_k exchangeable components of type $k \in \{1, 2\}$.

 Need to minimize over λ_k 's only, as min must be reached for $\lambda_k^{(0)}$'s (lower expected lifetimes \rightarrow lower component survival probabilities \rightarrow lower system survival probability).

Component Lifetimes

 The lifetimes for each k are assumed as Weibull with fixed shape β :

$$F_k(t | \lambda_k) = 1 - e^{-\lambda_k t^\beta}$$

$$R_k^*(t | \lambda_k) = \sqrt{\beta} \lambda_k t^{\beta-1} (1 + 1/\beta)$$

 We have information on λ_k from the component manufacturer, but do not fully trust it and model knowledge on λ_k cautiously with a set of priors $\lambda_k^{(0)}$.

Set of Priors

 Each $\lambda_k^{(0)}$ is taken as a set of conjugate inverse Gamma priors. In terms of canonical parameters $\alpha^{(k)}$, $\nu^{(k)}$, $\lambda_k^{(0)} = \{ \text{IG}(\alpha^{(k)} + 1, \nu^{(k)} \lambda_k^{(0)}) \mid \lambda_k^{(0)} \in \{ \lambda_k^{(0)}, \lambda_k^{(1)} \} \}$, where $\lambda_k^{(0)} = E[\lambda_k | \alpha^{(k)}, \nu^{(k)}]$ and $\lambda_k^{(1)}$ are pseudocounts. The prior parameter set $\{ \alpha^{(k)} = \lambda_k^{(0)}, \nu^{(k)} = \lambda_k^{(0)} \}$ allows for more imprecision in case of prior-data conflict [2].

Data

 We observe the system from startup until t_{rem} . For each i , the data $t_{i,k}$ consists of r_k failure times and $n_k - r_k$ censored observations. $\alpha^{(k)}$ and $\nu^{(k)}$ are updated to $\alpha^{(k)}$ and $\nu^{(k)}$ via Bayes' Rule.

$$L(\tau_{\text{rem}} > t | \{ \alpha^{(k)}, \nu^{(k)}, t_{i,k} \}_{i=1}^n) = \sum_{r_1=0}^{n_1} \dots \sum_{r_n=0}^{n_n} \sum_{k_1=1}^{n_1} \dots \sum_{k_n=1}^{n_n} \prod_{i=1}^n P(r_i^* = k_i | \lambda_k, \alpha^{(k)}, t_{i,k}^*)$$

 Survival signature $\phi_k = (\phi_k, \dots, \phi_k, 1)$
 $\phi_k = P(\text{system functions} | k \text{ is } k\text{-function})^{n_k}$

k_1	k_2	k_3	1
0	0	0	1
0	0	1	0.2
0	1	0	0
0	1	1	0.5
1	1	0	0.75
1	0	1	0
1	1	1	1


 Posterior predictive probability that k_i of the $n_k - r_k$ surviving k 's function at time t :

$$\binom{n_k - r_k}{k_i} \int P(r_i^* > t | T > t_{\text{rem}}, k_i) \times \left[1 - P(r_i^* > t | T > t_{\text{rem}}, k_i) \right]^{n_k - r_k - k_i} f_{k_i}(\lambda_k | \alpha^{(k)}, \nu^{(k)}, t_{i,k}^*) d\lambda_k$$


$$= \binom{n_k - r_k}{k_i} \sum_{j=1}^{n_k - r_k} (-1)^j \binom{n_k - r_k - k_i}{j} \left(\frac{\alpha^{(k)} \nu^{(k)}}{\alpha^{(k)} \nu^{(k)} + (k_i + j) t^\beta - (t_{\text{rem}})^\beta} \right)^{\alpha^{(k)} + 1}$$

 We assume $\beta = 2$, $R^*(1 | \alpha^{(1)}) \in [3, 15]$, $\alpha^{(1)} \in [2, 16]$, $R^*(1 | \alpha^{(2)}) \in [4, 5]$, $\alpha^{(2)} \in [3, 16]$, and $R^*(1 | \alpha^{(3)}) \in [3, 15]$, $\alpha^{(3)} \in [3, 5]$.


Failure times as expected



Surprisingly early failures



Surprisingly late failures



References


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System Reliability Estimation under Prior-Data Conflict

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System reliability

 We want to find the system reliability $P(T_{\text{sys}} > t)$ for a one-of-a-kind system:

 The system consists of n_k exchangeable components of types $k=1, \dots, K$.

 Need to minimize over λ_k^i 's only, as min must be reached for λ_k^i 's (lower expected lifetimes \rightarrow lower component survival probabilities \rightarrow lower system survival probability).

Component Lifetimes

 The lifetime for each k is assumed as Weibull with fixed shape β :

$$F_k(t | \lambda_k) = 1 - e^{-\lambda_k t^\beta}$$

$$R_k^*(t | \lambda_k) = \sqrt{\lambda_k} t^{\beta-1} (1 + 1/\beta)$$

 We have information on λ_k from the component manufacturer, but do not fully trust it and model knowledge on λ_k cautiously with a set of priors $\lambda_k^{(i)}$.

Set of Priors

 Each $\lambda_k^{(i)}$ is taken as a set of conjugate inverse Gamma priors. In terms of canonical parameters $\alpha^{(i)}$, $\nu^{(i)}$, $\lambda_k^{(i)} = \{ \text{IG}(\alpha^{(i)} + 1, \nu^{(i)} \lambda_k^{(i)}) \mid \lambda_k^{(i)} \in \mathbb{R}^+, \alpha^{(i)} \in \mathbb{R}^+ \}$, where $\lambda_k^{(i)} = E[\lambda_k | \alpha^{(i)}, \nu^{(i)}]$ and $\lambda_k^{(i)}$ are pseudocounts. The prior parameter set $\{ \alpha^{(i)} = \sum_{k=1}^K \lambda_k^{(i)}, \nu^{(i)} = \sum_{k=1}^K \nu_k^{(i)} \}$ allows for more inspection in case of prior-data conflict [2].

Data

 We observe the system from startup until t_{obs} . For each i , the data $t_{\text{obs}}^{(i)}$ consists of n_k failure times and $n_k - n_k$ censored observations. $\alpha^{(i)}$ and $\nu^{(i)}$ are updated to $\alpha^{(i)}$ and $\nu^{(i)}$ via Bayes' Rule.

$$L(\tau_{\text{obs}} > t | \{ \alpha^{(i)}, \nu^{(i)}, t_{\text{obs}}^{(i)} \}_{i=1}^I) = \prod_{i=1}^I \prod_{k=1}^K \prod_{j=1}^{n_k} P_i(t_j^* > t | \lambda_k^{(i)}, \alpha^{(i)}, \nu^{(i)}, t_{\text{obs}}^{(i)})$$

 Survival signature $\theta_{1;2} = (\theta_{1;2}^1 | \dots | \theta_{1;2}^K)$

 = P(system functions) | $\{ \theta_{1;2}^k \}$ function (λ_k^i)

λ_k^i	λ_k^i	λ_k^i	λ_k^i
0 0 0 0	0 2 1 1	1 0 0 0	1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0	1 0 0 0	0 1 0 0	1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0	1 0 1 0	0 1 0 0	1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0.5	1 1 1 0.75	0 1 0 0	1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0	1 1 1 0	0 1 0 0	1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0	1 1 1 0	0 1 0 0	1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0	1 1 1 0	0 1 0 0	1 0 0 0


 Posterior predictive probability that λ_k of $n_k - n_k$ surviving \square is function at time t :

$$\binom{n_k - n_k}{n_k} \int P_i(t > t | \tau > t_{\text{obs}}, \lambda_k^i) \prod_{j=1}^{n_k - n_k} P_i(t_j^* > t | \lambda_k^i, \alpha^{(i)}, \nu^{(i)}, t_{\text{obs}}^{(i)}) d\lambda_k^i$$


$$= \binom{n_k - n_k}{n_k} \sum_{j=1}^{n_k - n_k} (-1)^{j-1} \binom{n_k - n_k}{j} \left(\frac{\alpha^{(i)} + j}{\alpha^{(i)} + n_k + (n_k - j)(\beta - 1)} \right)^{\alpha^{(i)} + 1}$$

 We assume $\beta = 2$, $R^*(t | \alpha^{(1)}) \in [3, 15]$, $\alpha^{(1)} \in [2, 16]$, $R^*(t | \alpha^{(2)}) \in [4, 5]$, $\alpha^{(2)} \in [3, 16]$, and $R^*(t | \alpha^{(3)}) \in [3, 15]$, $\alpha^{(3)} \in [3, 5]$.


Failure times as expected



Surprisingly early failures




Surprisingly late failures



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- [2] G. Walter. Generalized Bayesian Inference under Prior-Data Conflict. PhD thesis, Department of Statistics, LMU Munich, 2013. <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/271335>.

Surprisingly early failures




Survival signature $\Phi(l_1, \dots, l_K)$ [1]

$= P(\text{system functions} \mid \{l_k \text{ 's function}\}^{1:K})$

l_1	l_2	l_3	Φ	l_1	l_2	l_3	Φ
0	0	0	0	0	2	1	1
0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0
0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0.5
0	1	1	0.5	1	1	1	0.75
0	2	0	1	\vdots	\vdots	\vdots	\vdots


Surprisingly early failures



Survival signature $\Phi(l_1, \dots, l_K)$ [1]
 $= P(\text{system functions} \mid \{l_k \text{ k's function}\}^{1:K})$

l_1	l_2	l_3	Φ	l_1	l_2	l_3	Φ
0	0	0	0	0	2	1	1
0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0
0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0.5
0	1	1	0.5	1	1	1	0.75
0	2	0	1	\vdots	\vdots	\vdots	\vdots

Surprisingly early failures



$$\underline{P}(T_{\text{sys}} > t \mid \{n_k^{(0)}, y_k^{(0)}, \mathbf{t}_{e_k; n_k}^k\}^{1:K})$$

$$= \min_{n_1^{(0)}, \dots, n_K^{(0)}} \sum_{l_1=0}^{n_1-e_1} \dots \sum_{l_K=0}^{n_K-e_K} \Phi(l_1, \dots, l_K) \prod_{k=1}^K P(C_t^k = l_k \mid n_k^{(0)}, \underline{y}_k^{(0)}, \mathbf{t}_{e_k; n_k}^k)$$